The Business Cycle And Competition In The U.S. Brewing Industry by Gallet, Craig A. & Euzent, Patricia J.
The Journal of Applied Business Research                                                                  Volume 18, Number 2 
 89 
The Business Cycle And Competition 
In The U.S. Brewing Industry 
Craig A. Gallet, (Email:  cgallet@juno.com), California State University at Sacramento 
Patricia J. Euzent, (Email:  peuzent@bus.ucf.edu), University of Central Florida 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Recent game-theoretic models of cartel behavior assess the sustainability of cooperation in the 
presence of demand fluctuations.  Depending on the stochastic assumptions of demand, different 
outcomes are predicted.  Accordingly, this paper investigates the effects of demand fluctuations on 
competition in the U.S. brewing industry.  The results show that competition among brewers is 
greater during periods associated with significant negative shocks to demand, lower observed de-
mand, lower expected future industry profit, and lower advertising. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
ecent game-theoretic studies of the effect of demand fluctuations on competition focus on cartel stabil-
ity over the business cycle.  For example, Green and Porter (1984) argue that in a market with a sto-
chastic demand it is more difficult to detect cheating, since an observed lower market price could be 
the result of cheating or an unobserved drop in demand.  In such an environment, Green and Porter 
(GP) suggest that a trigger price mechanism could be used to sustain cooperation.  In particular, an observed price 
below the trigger price is deemed unlikely to occur from a random drop in demand.  Inferring that cheating has oc-
curred, a punishment phase ensues.  Unfortunately, although this policy is severe enough to deter cheating, in order 
to maintain credibility of the punishment cooperating firms must price more competitively whenever price drops be-
low the trigger level, even though they know that such a drop is due to a fall in demand.  Hence, the GP model con-
tends that firms will behave more competitively during periods with significant unobserved drops in demand.
1 
 
  Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) offer an alternative to the GP model.  Namely, assuming that contempora-
neous demand is observed but subject to identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) shocks, Rotemberg and Sa-
loner (RS) argue that a cartel will behave more competitively during periods of high demand.  The reasons for this 
are quite intuitive.  First, during periods of observed high demand, since any firm that cheats on the cooperative 
agreement expects to reap significant sales, the benefits from cheating are very high.  Second, given the assumption 
of i.i.d. demand shocks, firms that cheat during periods of high demand can expect to be punished in the future when 
demand and profit return to normal levels.
2
  Therefore, the cost to a firm from cheating, in terms of the sacrifice of 
its share of expected future industry profit, is lower.  Knowing that the temptation to cheat is greatest when observed 
demand is high and expected future industry profit is low, cooperating firms then price more competitively during 
such periods to deter cheating.
3 
 
  Perhaps driven by the affection held by the consumers of its product, competition in the U.S. brewing in-
dustry has attracted the attention of many.  According to Elzinga (1995), the brewing industry has become increa-
singly dominated by a few major brewers.  Moreover, since the 1950s changing conditions have led to fluctuations 
in the demand for beer from year to year.  Accordingly, this  paper investigates  the effect of  demand 
__________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
fluctuations on competition in the brewing industry.  In Section II, we briefly summarize the characteristics of the 
brewing industry that support its use as a candidate to evaluate these theories.  Section III presents the empirical 
model, with the data and empirical results provided in Section IV.  The paper concludes with a summary in Section 
R 
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V.  Section VI offers suggestions for future research. 
 
II. The U.S. Brewing Industry 
 
Since the theories discussed above pertain to firms operating in a tight oligopoly in the presence of demand 
fluctuations, several features of the U.S. brewing industry suggest that it may be an ideal candidate to evaluate these 
theories.  First, as indicated in Table 1, concentration in the industry has been increasing over the past 50 years, 
leading to a market that is currently dominated by a few major brewers.   
 
Table 1.  U.S. Brewing Industry Concentration for Selected Years. 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Year 5-Firm     10-Firm         Herfindahl  
    Concentration  Concentration         Index 
   Ratio        Ratio 
1947    19.0      28.2     140 
1954    24.9      38.3     240 
1958    28.5      45.2     310 
1964    39.0      58.2     440 
1968    47.6      63.2     690 
1974    64.0      80.8   1080 
1978    74.3      92.3   1292 
1981    75.9      93.9   1614 
1984    87.3      94.2   1938 
1987    87.9      93.9   2280 
1990    88.6      94.3   2565 
1992    87.6      93.4   2594 
__________________________________________________________ 
Source: Elzinga (1995). 
 
Second, in light of the extensive advertising requirements to effectively compete in the industry, competi-
tion from new entrants is limited.  Third, Elzinga (1995), Gallet and List (1998), and the Federal Trade Commission 
(1978) point out that changes in the demographics of beer consumers (such as the increasing share of younger drink-
ers following the baby boom years), changes in policy (such as adjustments to the minimum allowable drinking 
age), and concerns over the health consequences of drinking have contributed to structural changes in the demand 
for beer over time.  Indeed, McGahan (1995) provides evidence that demand fluctuations affected competition 
among brewers immediately following the repeal of Prohibition in 1933.  
 
III. The Empirical Model  
  
We estimate the impact of demand fluctuations on the strength of competition in the brewing industry using 
a market demand and supply model.  To begin, consider the following demand for beer: 
 
Qt = f(Pt, Yt, t)                           (1) 
 
where Qt is the quantity of beer in period t, Pt is the price of beer in period t, Yt is a vector of exogenous factors in 
period t thought to affect the demand for beer, and   t is a stochastic (error) term in period t. 
 
  Similar to Appelbaum (1982), Bresnahan (1982), and many others, quantity is determined via a supply rela-
tionship, given by: 
 
Pt = MCt - t•Pt'•Qt + vt                       (2) 
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where MCt is marginal cost in period t, Pt is the slope of the inverse demand in period t, vt is an error term in period 
t, and  t is a gauge of the degree of competition in period t.  For example,  t equal to 0 coincides with a competitive 
market, whereas  t equal to 1 coincides with joint profit maximization.  Lower (higher) values of  t within the zero-
one interval indicate less (more) departure of price from marginal cost, and hence a higher (lower) degree of compe-
tition. 
 
  Similar to recent studies (see, for example, Rubinovitz (1993) and Barros (1996)) that estimate the competi-
tive effect of different factors by treating  t as a function of these factors, we assume  t depends upon variables re-
levant to the theories of collusion over the business cycle.  In doing so, several issues pertaining to the specification 
of our model must be addressed.  First, since the theories deal with shifts of the demand curve, we adopt a linear 
specification of demand and use the horizontal intercept (Pt = 0) as a measure of the level of demand.
4
   
 
  Second, since the GP model focuses on stochastic shifts of demand, whereas the RS model focuses on non-
stochastic shifts of demand, we must account for the observed and unobserved levels of demand.  Following Baker 
(1989), we do this by treating the error term () in the demand equation as the unobserved level of demand and the 
remaining portion of demand (holding Pt = 0) as the observed level of demand.  Furthermore, since the GP model 
predicts that only significant unobserved decreases in demand will trigger more competitive behavior, we need to 
focus on the negative values of t when addressing the GP model.  McGahan’s study of the 1930s brewing industry 
does this by assuming that  t is a function of a dummy variable (which equals one whenever  t < 0 and zero oth-
erwise).  However, even though the estimated negative relationship between this dummy variable and  t implies that 
unobserved decreases in demand coincide with more competitive behavior in the brewing industry, McGahan’s ap-
proach misses an important point of the GP model, namely that only large unobserved decreases in demand should 
trigger more competitive behavior.  Therefore, to account for this, we use a two-step procedure outlined by Baker 
(1989).  First, after estimating the demand for beer, the residuals from the estimated demand equation become esti-
mates of the demand errors, which are then used to construct the following dummy variable: 
 
Dt   = 1 if et < -T•s 
        = 0 if et ≥ -T•s                          (3) 
 
where et is the demand residual in period t, s is the standard error of the estimate of the demand equation (which is 
used to account for volatility of the demand curve), and T is a positive scalar.  Second, the reported value of T, along 
with the estimated coefficients of the supply relationship, are determined using a grid search technique.
5
  Conse-
quently, we account for unusual shocks to demand by letting Dt take on a value of one only in the presence of truly 
meaningful unobserved demand reductions.   
 
  Third, to account for the predictions of the RS model, we need measures of the level of observed demand 
(OBSt) and the value of expected future industry profit (Et).  Accordingly, since the demand error captures the un-
observed level of demand, we use the fitted value of Qt, net of the residual (holding Pt = 0), as the measure of ob-
served demand.  We then follow a procedure outlined by Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) and Gallet and Schroeter 
(1995) to derive the present discounted value of expected future industry profit as an indicator of expected future in-
dustry profit.  In particular, current and lagged values of industry profit components (i.e., revenue and cost terms) 
are used to estimate Et following a vector autoregression procedure.  However, since this technique comes from 
existing literature, readers are encouraged to see Rotemberg and Woodford and Gallet and Schroeter for thorough 
discussions of this technique.  
  Finally, since advertising has played a role in the behavior of firms in this industry, we adopt the customary 
approach (see, for example, Comanor and Wilson (1967), Eckard (1987), and Das, Chappell, and Shughart (1993)) 
of using the advertising-to-sales ratio (ASt) as a means of accounting for the effect of advertising on competition.
6
  
To account for the various factors thought to affect competition in the brewing industry, we then assume the follow-
ing relationship for   t: 
 
t = 0 + 1Dt + 2OBSt + 3Et + 4ASt                     (4) 
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where the  i’s are estimable parameters and the variables are as previously defined.   
 
  The signs of the estimated i’s from equation (4) determine the effect of each respective variable on the de-
gree of competition.  For example, concerning the role of demand fluctuations, if the GP model is correct, then com-
petition will be greater when demand encounters large negative shocks ( 1 < 0).  Alternatively, if the RS model 
holds, then competition will be greater when observed demand is high and industry profit is expected to be low in 
the future ( 2 < 0 and  3 > 0).  Finally, whether advertising plays a pro-competitive or anti-competitive role in the 
brewing industry will be accounted for by the estimate of  4.  
 
  To complete the model, we adopt a generalized Leontief cost function, such that when combined with a li-
near demand,  t is identified.  Accordingly, the demand and total cost functions are given by: 
 
Qt = 0 + 1Y1t + 2Y2t + 3Y3t + 4Pt + t                    (5) 
and 
TCt = i j ij(Wit•Wjt)
½
Qt + i iWit (i,j = 1,2,3)                   (6) 
 
where, for simplicity, the exogenous factors in total cost and demand (Wit and Yit) have been truncated to include 
three variables. Solving for marginal cost in equation (6), and substituting equation (4) into the supply relationship, 
equation (2) becomes: 
 
Pt = 11W1t + 22W2t + 33W3t + 212(W1t•W2t)
½
  + 213(W1t•W3t)
½
  + 223(W2t•W3t)
½
 
          - {( 0 + 1Dt + 2OBSt + 3Et + 4ASt)/ 4}• Qt + vt               (7) 
 
  The model, given by equations (5) and (7), is estimated using two steps.  First, equation (5) is estimated us-
ing two stage least squares (2SLS).  Second, using the demand results to construct Dt and OBSt, equation (7) is esti-
mated across all possible values of T, the scalar used in Dt.  The estimated coefficients of the supply relationship 
then coincide with the value of T that minimizes the 2SLS objective function.  The data and empirical results are 
provided in the next section. 
 
IV. Data and Empirical Results 
 
Data 
 
  The model is estimated using annual data over the 1964-1992 period.  With respect to demand, total con-
sumption of beer in the U.S. (QBt) is assumed to depend upon U.S. disposable income (INCt), the U.S. population 
18 years and older (POP18t), the price of wine (PWt), total advertising expenditures of the brewing industry (ADt), 
and the price of beer (PBt).  Beer consumption, sales expenditure (used to construct the advertising-to-sales ratio), 
and advertising expenditure data were collected from Brewer’s Almanac.  Beer and wine prices came from the 
Handbook of Labor Statistics and the CPI Detailed Report.  Figures for the U.S. population 18 years and older and 
U.S. disposable income were obtained from Current Population Reports and the Economic Report of the President, 
respectively.  Finally, beer and wine prices, disposable income, and advertising expenditures were deflated by the 
consumer price index, which was also taken from the Economic Report of the President. 
 
  As for supply, the average hourly wage of a beer worker (WGt) and the prices of corn (PCt) and barley 
(PBAt) are included as exogenous shifters of marginal cost.  The wage data came from Brewer’s Almanac, while the 
prices of corn and barley were collected from the Survey of Current Business.  All prices in the supply equation were 
deflated by the producer price index, which was obtained from the Economic Report of the President.  Given these 
data, the specifications of demand and supply become: 
 
Qt = 0 + 1INCt + 2POP18t + 3PWt + 4ADt + 5PBt + t               (8) 
and 
PBt = 11WGt + 22PBAt + 33PCt + 212(WGt•PBAt)
½
  + 213(WGt•PCt)
½
  + 223(PBAt•PCt)
½
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            - {( 0 + 1Dt + 2OBSt + 3E + 4ASt)/ 5}• QBt + vt               (9) 
 
Empirical Results 
 
  The empirical results from the estimation of equations (8) and (9) are reported in Table 2.  Since the Dur-
bin-Watson statistic failed to conclusively suggest autocorrelated error terms, equations (8) and (9) were not ad-
justed for serial correlation.
7
  With respect to the estimated demand equation, as expected we find that demand 
slopes downward and increases with the U.S. population and the price of wine.  Also, the estimated negative coeffi-
cient of income suggests that beer is an inferior good.
8
  Finally, advertising has no significant effect on the demand 
for beer.     
 
  Holding the price of beer equal to zero, the results from the estimation of demand are used to construct the 
observed and unobserved levels of demand.  Equation (9) is then estimated across all conceivable values of T, and 
therefore all possible constructions of Dt, where the results are provided in Table 2.  With respect to marginal cost, 
the estimated coefficients offer mixed results.  In particular, when evaluated at the sample means, although marginal 
cost is increasing in the input prices, the negative estimates of several of the marginal cost coefficients fail to sup-
port concavity of the cost function.  Nonetheless, several interesting results emerge from the estimation of  t.  First, 
in support of the GP model, the negative estimate of  1 indicates that competition among brewers since the 1960s 
has been greater during periods associated with significant unobserved decreases in demand.  Second, although the 
positive estimate of  2 fails to support the RS claim that greater competition coincides with higher observed de-
mand, the positive estimate of  3 does support RS to the extent that greater competition coincides with lower ex-
pected future industry profit.  Finally, the positive estimate of  4 shows that advertising decreases competition in the 
brewing industry.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 
  Recent theories of oligopoly behavior provide testable hypotheses concerning the effect of demand fluctua-
tions on competition.  In this paper, we estimated an empirical model of the U.S. brewing industry, where the results 
support several aspects of these theories.  Namely, competition in the brewing industry since the 1960s has been 
greater when demand and expected future industry profit are low.  Moreover, we find that advertising promotes 
market power, and thereby reduces competition among brewers. 
 
VI.  Suggestions for Future Research 
 
  While studies of the demand for beer are common in the literature, less attention has been devoted to the 
supply side of the market.  Hence, as an avenue of future research, it is worthwhile to consider alternative models of 
producer behavior in the brewing industry.  For example, since various public policies have been directed towards 
the industry (ranging from taxes to health warnings), addressing the impact of these policies on the nature of compe-
tition in the industry would be of interest.  
 
Table 2.  Estimation Results. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Parameter              Estimate           t-ratio 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Demand Parameters: 
   0          75434000.00        0.972 
   1               -62892.90
a
                 -3.696 
   2            2537070.00
a
                  4.779   
   3              782131.00
b
       2.776  
   4            6.70      0.918 
   5           -2193770.00
a
                   -8.441    
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R-squared = 0.98 
Durbin-Watson = 1.63 
Sample Size = 28 
 
Supply Parameters: 
   11        -5.97
b
      -2.235 
   22     -437.78
b
                -2.149 
   33     -329.00
b
                   -2.030 
   12        34.85
b
               2.334 
   13        -7.35       -0.600 
   23      358.11
b
                 2.025 
   0         0.04         1.008 
   1       -0.38 E-02
a
                              4.310 
   2        0.65 E-09
a
                     8.109 
   3        0.32 E-12
a
        5.691 
   4        0.14
a
                        5.410 
  
R-squared = 0.81 
Durbin-Watson = 2.14 
Sample Size = 28 
T = 1.24 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a
 Significant at 1% level. 
b
 Significant at 5% level. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Empirical support for the GP model is provided by Porter’s (1983) and Ellison’s (1994) studies of the 
1880s railroad industry and Baker’s (1989) study of the steel industry.  
2 Rotemberg and Saloner’s assumption of i.i.d. demand shifts implies that expected future demand is inde-
pendent of current demand.  Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) and Bagwell and Staiger (1997) extend the 
RS model by allowing demand shifts to be correlated over time.  
3 Empirical support for this model is provided by Gallet and Schroeter’s (1995) study of the rayon industry 
and Rosenbaum and Sukharomana’s (2001) study of the cement industry. 
4 Often cited as support for the GP model, several studies (e.g., Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986)) 
have regressed price-cost margins on industry sales and found that competition is greater (i.e., price-cost 
margins are lower) when sales are lower.  However, since the game-theoretic models are based upon shifts 
of demand, one limitation of these studies is that using  sales as a regressor makes it difficult to determine if 
such observations are the result of shifts or movements along the demand curve.  Our approach specifically 
addresses shifts of demand.  
5 Specifically, the coefficients of the supply relationship are estimated across all conceivable values of T, 
where the reported results correspond to that iteration which optimizes the objective function used to esti-
mate supply. 
6 There are different viewpoints concerning the effect of advertising on competition.  For example, incum-
bent firm advertising may raise entry barriers by forcing entrants to aggressively advertise to secure market 
share, thereby decreasing competition.  Alternatively, advertising can provide information to consumers re-
garding price, quality, and location, thereby stimulating entry and competition.  
7 When both equations were adjusted for serial correlation, the autocorrelation coefficients were insignifi-
cantly different from zero.  Hence, we only report results for the unadjusted equations. 
8 Niskanen (1962), Comanor and Wilson (1974), and Gallet and List (1998) also find beer to be an inferior 
good. 
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